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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici curiae, legal experts in international and
constitutional law, believe that a majority of the en
banc panel in Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc), mistakenly affirmed Ali
Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul’s conviction by a
military commission for a non-international war
crime. The main concurring opinion in that case
misconceived how international law defines the
jurisdiction of law-of-war military commissions. As
amici argue below, it is the Constitution—not
international law—that limits the jurisdiction of lawof-war military commissions.2
Amici have a professional interest in clarifying
the relationship between international and
constitutional law as it bears on the jurisdiction of
military commissions, especially absent apparent
geographic or temporal limits on the conflict known
as the global war on terror.
The appendix includes a full list of amici.
All parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and written
copies have been filed with the Clerk of the Court. Supreme
Court Rule 37.3(a). Counsel of record for all parties received
notice of amici’s intent to file a brief at least 10 days prior to the
due date. Id., Rule 37.2(a). Counsel for amici affirm that counsel
for a party did not write any part of this brief. Nor has any
person or entity contributed financially to the preparation or
submission of this brief. Id., Rule 37.6.
1

Unless otherwise indicated, “commission” and “tribunal” refer
to law-of-war military commissions, not commissions created
during periods of occupation or to try violations of martial law.
2

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Article III of the U.S. Constitution vests the
judicial power in the federal courts and mandates
that all crimes be tried by jury. This Court has
construed the Constitution to permit the
establishment of military commissions to try war
crimes in circumstances of military necessity, based
on pragmatic considerations and the combined war
powers of the President and Congress. To minimize
intrusion on Article III, however, the Court has
prudently limited military commission jurisdiction to
the prosecution of crimes that violate the law of war,
which, by definition, is part of the law of nations.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit wrongly affirmed Ali Hamza
Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul’s conviction by military
commission for inchoate conspiracy. That crime does
not violate the law of war, precluding the
commission’s jurisdiction. To justify jurisdiction in
excess of the limits that this Court has placed on
military commissions, the D.C. Circuit’s main
concurring opinion rejected even the government’s
proposed limits (themselves broader than the limits
set by this Court) and declined to impose any
jurisdictional restrictions. That view is based on a
misconception of international law and of how
international and constitutional law interact. The
main concurrence also conflated the power of the
political branches to establish military commissions,
despite Article III, with the power to specify offenses
triable by military commission.

3

The law of war, a branch of international law,
establishes the outer boundaries of military
commission jurisdiction. Allowing the commission’s
jurisdiction to encompass offenses other than war
crimes transfers authority to adjudicate certain
federal crimes from the federal courts to the executive
branch. Hence, “Trial by military commission raises
separation-of-powers concerns of the highest order.”
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
Because the armed conflict known as the global
war on terror lacks apparent geographic and temporal
limits, a decision to vest military commissions with
jurisdiction over wholly domestic crimes effectively
empowers the political branches to use military
commissions as alternatives to federal courts
anywhere in the global theater of war for an indefinite
period. This is not hyperbole. The D.C. Circuit’s main
concurring opinion not only rejected the government’s
position that military commission jurisdiction is
limited to war crimes and crimes that historically
have been tried before such commissions; it further
speculated that military commissions might be
helpful to try, for example, innovative cybercrimes.
With the nation on a long-term war footing, military
commissions threaten to become a permanent feature
of the federal judicial landscape, untethered by the
jurisdictional limits that this Court has imposed.
A military commission convicted Bahlul more than
seven years ago. His case has been pending in the
D.C. Circuit for more than five years. Despite its
numerous decisions in Bahlul, the D.C. Circuit has
been unable to agree on any jurisdictional limits on

4

military commissions. This issue “is extraordinarily
important and deserves a definitive answer,” Bahlul,
840 F.3d at 760 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring), which
only this Court can provide.
This Court has never countenanced such a broad
and vague exception to Article III. It should grant
certiorari
to
safeguard the integrity
and
independence of the federal courts—and to clarify
that the same necessity that authorizes military
commissions also limits their jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S MAIN
CONCURRENCE MISTAKENLY
TREATED INTERNATIONAL LAW—
RATHER THAN THE CONSTITUTION—
AS THE JUDICIAL CONSTRAINT ON
MILITARY COMMISSION
JURISDICTION

A military commission convicted Ali Hamza
Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul of conspiracy to commit
war crimes. Bahlul, 840 F.3d 757, 758 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (en banc) (per curiam); Bahlul v. United States,
767 F.3d 1, 7–8, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). The
government has conceded that Bahlul’s crime is not a
war crime under international law. Brief for the
United States at 34, Bahlul, 840 F.3d 757 (No. 111324). The D.C. Circuit nonetheless upheld Bahlul’s
conviction based in part on the main concurrence’s
expansive and unprecedented view of military

5

commission jurisdiction. Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 758 (per
curiam); id. at 760 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
The D.C. Circuit’s main concurring opinion is
predicated on the erroneous assumption that if
Bahlul’s challenge were to succeed, foreign nations,
acting through “the guise” of international law, would
be entitled to “dictate” constraints on a U.S. military
commission’s jurisdiction and that international law
would be incorporated “into the U.S. Constitution as
a judicially enforceable constraint on Congress and
the President.”
Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 759, 772
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). This is a straw man.
Contrary to that opinion’s characterization, this
Court consistently has recognized only a narrow,
atextual exception to Article III for military
commissions and has used the law of war to set the
boundary of that exception.
A. This Court Recognized a Narrow, Atextual
Exception to Article III by Placing a Limited
Judicial Power in Law-of-War Military
Commissions.
Article III provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish,” and that “[t]he
Trial of all Crimes, except in cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury.”
While Article III’s text admits no exceptions to
these mandates, this Court has recognized a handful
of narrow exceptions that authorize the political
branches to exercise adjudicatory power in limited

6

circumstances. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Military
Courts and Article III, 103 Geo. L.J. 933, 934 (2015).
Such departures from Article III’s usual exclusivity
are rare and, because they facially violate Article III’s
text, demand constitutional justification.
For military tribunals, that justification is necessity,
which defines—and for the same reason limits—the
nature and scope of their jurisdiction. See Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590 (2006) (plurality opinion)
(stressing that “each aspect of [a military commission’s]
seemingly broad jurisdiction” is “supported by a
separate military exigency”); see also Ex Parte Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 21–22 (1866); Ex Parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 35–37 (1942).
A law-of-war military commission’s jurisdiction
therefore is “limited to offenses cognizable during
time of war” and “its role is primarily a factfinding
one—to determine, typically on the battlefield itself,
whether the defendant has violated the law of war.”
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 596–97 (plurality opinion).
Colonel William Winthrop—the “Blackstone of
Military
Law”—wrote
that
these
military
commissions have jurisdiction only over war crimes
committed during war and in the “theatre of war.”
See id., 548 U.S. at 597–98 (quoting Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957)); William Winthrop,
Military Law and Precedents 836–41 (rev. 2d ed.
1920) (hereinafter “Winthrop”).
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B. Law-of-War Military Commissions May Only
Prosecute War Crimes Recognized by the Law
of Nations.
This Court first sustained a law-of-war military
commission in Ex Parte Quirin, in which saboteurs
violated the law of war during World War II by going
behind enemy lines to destroy property used or useful
in prosecuting war. This conduct, according to the
Court, violated the law of war and was subject to
punishment by military commission, a precept that
had “so generally been accepted as valid by
authorities on international law.” 317 U.S. at 35–36.3
This Court explained the law of war as part of
international law: “From the very beginning of its
history this Court has recognized and applied the law
of war as including that part of the law of nations
which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status,
rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy
individuals.” Id. at 27–28. Quirin thus correctly
The D.C. Circuit’s main concurrence erred by citing Quirin as
an example of a military commission trying a crime other than a
war crime. Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 763 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
The Court in Quirin, as discussed, stated that the conduct
relevant to its holding violated the law of war. Quirin, 317 U.S.
at 35–36. Further, at that time, the status of espionage as an
offense against the law of nations was, at best, ambiguous. See,
e.g., 2 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise § 252
(Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952) (listing “espionage” as
one of four kinds of “war crimes”); see also id. § 255 (“Espionage
. . . bear[s] a twofold character. International Law gives a right
to belligerents to use [it]. On the other hand, it gives a right to
belligerents to consider [it], when committed by enemy soldiers
or enemy private individuals . . . as [an] act[] of illegitimate
warfare, and consequently liable to punishment—though it
seems improper to charactise [sic] such act[s] as war crimes.”).
3
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defined “law of war” as a “branch of international
law.” Id. at 29. In the course of describing that law,
the Court cited the Fourth Hague Convention and
numerous treatises on international law. See id. at
30 n.7, 31 n.8.
In Quirin, Article of War 15 authorized military
commission jurisdiction as a narrow exception to
Article III but properly restricted that jurisdiction to
violations of the law of war. Id. at 29. Even with
these jurisdictional restrictions, “Quirin represents
the high-water mark of military power to try enemy
combatants for war crimes.” Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 597
(plurality opinion).

In re Yamashita again considered the jurisdiction
of military commissions to be confined to offenses
against the law of war. 327 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1946).
Citing the Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention,
the Court held that “acts directed against the civilian
population of an occupied country and against
prisoners of war are recognized in international law
as violations of the law of war.” Id. at 14. Similarly,
in Johnson v. Eisentrager, the Court found “a basis in
conventional and long-established law” for violations
of the law of war. 339 U.S. 763, 787 (1950). That
“conventional and long-established law” was
international law. Id. at 787–88. Eisentrager thus
exclusively cited international legal sources,
including the Hague Conventions and Oppenheim’s,
Vattel’s, and Lawrence’s international law treatises,
to reach this conclusion. Id.
In Hamdan, the government charged Salim
Ahmed Hamdan with conspiracy to commit offenses
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triable by military commission. 548 U.S. at 569–70
(majority opinion). A plurality held that Hamdan’s
conspiracy charge is not an offense that by the law of
war may be tried by military commission. Id. at 610–
12 (plurality opinion). This is in contrast to the main
concurrence’s finding in Bahlul that conspiracy is
“well within” the limits of a military commission’s
jurisdiction, “[w]herever one might ultimately draw”
those limits. Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 771 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring). By reviewing international law sources,
the plurality found that conspiracy “does not appear
in either the Geneva Conventions or the Hague
Conventions—the major treaties on the law of war.”
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion).
C. This Court Has Recognized that the
Constitution Limits the Jurisdiction of
Military Commissions to Violations of the Law
of War.
The D.C. Circuit’s main concurrence in Bahlul
failed to recognize that this Court has limited the
subject matter jurisdiction of military commissions to
violations of the law of war.
That opinion
characterized Bahlul’s contention—that because
inchoate conspiracy is not an offense under
international law, the commission lacked jurisdiction
to try him—as “extraordinary.” Bahlul, 840 F.3d at
759 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Quite the contrary,
this Court has described military commissions, not
the role of international law in defining their
jurisdiction, as “extraordinary”: “[T]rial by military
commission is an extraordinary measure raising
important questions about the balance of power in our
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constitutional structure . . . .” Hamdan, 548 U.S. at
567 (majority opinion).
In a government of delegated powers, neither
Congress nor the President, even acting together,
may constitutionally depart from Article III’s vesting
of the judicial power in the federal courts, except in
the rare circumstances recognized by this Court.
Even under these circumstances, the Constitution
does not authorize the political branches to define the
jurisdiction of military commissions without regard to
the limits imposed by the Constitution.
II.

THE EXPANSION OF MILITARY
COMMISSION JURISDICTION
THREATENS TO FURTHER ATROPHY
THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE
OF ARTICLE III FEDERAL COURTS

A. Removing Judicial Power from the Judicial
Branch, and Placing that Power in the Political
Branches, Threatens the Integrity of the
Judicial Branch and the Right to Trial by Jury.
An independent judiciary is fundamental to the
American system of governance: the Declaration of
Independence cited it as a basis for the American
Revolution, and the judicial system’s structural and
individual rights safeguards were enshrined in
Article III of the Constitution. See The Declaration of
Independence para. 11 (U.S. 1776); Stern v. Marshall,
564 U.S. 462, 483–84 (2011). Article III “protects the
independence of the Judicial Branch” and “is ‘an
inseparable element of the constitutional system of
checks and balances.’” Stern, 564 U.S. at 482–83
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(quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
Article III could not “serve its purpose in the
system of checks and balances” if the legislative or
executive branches “could confer the Government’s
‘judicial power’ on entities outside of Article III.”
Stern, 564 U.S. at 484. Thus, absent rare exceptions,
the judicial power “cannot be shared with the
Legislature or Executive.” B&B Hardware, Inc. v.
Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1316 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring). “[S]o long as the judiciary remains
truly distinct from both the legislature and the
Executive,” “the general liberty of the people can
never be endangered” from “the courts of justice.” The
Federalist No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (C.
Rossiter ed., 1961). Liberty has everything “to fear
from” a merger with the political branches that would
degrade the judiciary’s independence. Id. at 465
(“[F]rom the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is
in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed, or
influenced by its co-ordinate branches.”).
Article III’s mandates remain in force during war.
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798
(2008) (“The laws and the Constitution are designed
to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary
times.”); Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120. The right
to a criminal trial before a jury within an independent
judicial system was at least as important to the
Framers as the right to habeas corpus described in
Boumediene: It was included in the Declaration of
Independence, Article III, and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, and it is emphasized throughout the
Federalist Papers. See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11,

12

16 (1955) (“This right of trial by jury ranks very high
in our catalogue of constitutional safeguards.”);
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 119–20. It applies
“equally in war and in peace, and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times,
and under all circumstances.” See Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) at 120–21. Thus, to protect the judicial
branch’s independence, integrity, and robust role in
the Constitution’s delicate structure of checks and
balances, military commissions must have defined,
narrow limits.
B. The Jurisdiction of Law-of-War Military
Commissions Is Limited by the Necessity that
Justifies the Commissions’ Existence.
“The military commission, a tribunal neither
mentioned in the Constitution nor created by statute,
was born of military necessity.” Hamdan, 548 U.S. at
590 (plurality opinion); see also Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) at 76–80. It is not a federal court “ordain[ed] and
establish[ed]” by Congress. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1;
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121.
Military commissions have, historically and
functionally, proved necessary in three contexts—
martial law, occupation, and war. See Hamdan, 548 U.S.
at 595–96 (plurality opinion). During the former two,
necessity compels the establishment of a temporary
substitute that can administer justice expeditiously and
fairly until the national judiciary resumes operating
normally. Cf. Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of
Belligerent Occupation 133–35 (2009).
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The rationale for law-of-war commissions differs,
see Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion), as does
their jurisdiction. Unlike the other two types of
commissions, law-of-war commissions do not adjudicate
all crimes and civil cases during times of martial law or
military occupation. See id. In those circumstances, the
regular courts may not be “open and their process
unobstructed.” Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121.
Because it may be impracticable to try war crimes on the
battlefield, see generally Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779,
the Court has recognized that it may be necessary
during wartime “to seize and subject to disciplinary
measures those enemies who in their attempt to
thwart or impede our military effort have violated the
law of war.” Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28–29. Military
commissions prosecute battlefield violations of the law
of war during wartime. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 518 (2004); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27–29. Practical
considerations, like distance and lack of institutions or
staff, may preclude trying war crimes in courts martial
or regular federal courts.
For such functional reasons, the Court has
approved military commissions based on the historical
methodology of constitutional interpretation expressed
in the context of executive power by Justice Frankfurter:
“Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting
government cannot supplant the Constitution or
legislation, but they give meaning to the words” and
take into account “the gloss which life has written upon
them.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The
Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
This constitutional
methodology can also apply in contexts, like the present
one, other than executive power. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v.
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Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60 (2014)
(collecting cases).
At times, history thus properly informs the meaning
of the Constitution. But the historical precedents that
authorize military commissions also limit them. And
historically, it is this Court’s interpretation of the
constitutional role of international law in defining the
commission’s jurisdiction that has imposed “judicially
enforceable constraint[s]” on the jurisdiction of military
commissions. Bahlul may not be convicted by military
commission for a crime that, as the government
concedes, Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 759 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring), international law does not recognize as
triable by military commission.
“The tendency of a principle to expand itself to the
limit of its logic” must “be counteracted by the
tendency to confine itself within the limits of its
history.” Benjamin J. Cardozo, The Nature of the
Judicial Process 51 (1921). Necessity supplies a
rationale for establishing a temporary non-Article III
tribunal for prosecuting war crimes. It does not
supply a rationale for vesting that tribunal with
jurisdiction over crimes that do not violate the law of
war. Perhaps, as the D.C. Circuit’s main concurrence
suggested, tribunals with broader jurisdiction would
be expedient in the global war on terror. See Bahlul,
840 F.3d at 770–71 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
(discussing cyberattacks as a potential crime triable
by military commission). But expedience does not, of
course, render such tribunals constitutional.
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C. Necessity Limits Military Commissions’
Jurisdiction to Offenses Against the
(International) Law of War.
Because necessity alone authorizes the military
commission, it perforce limits the commission’s
jurisdiction by reference to the particular, concrete
necessity at issue—“the exigencies of war.” Hamdan,
548 U.S. at 590 (plurality opinion); see also Milligan,
71 U.S. at 90. Battlefield necessity also reinforces
what Quirin, Yamashita, Eisentrager, and Hamdan
all express or imply: the law of war is part of
international law and thus limits the jurisdiction of
law-of-war military commissions.
In non-military-commission cases, this Court has
also affirmed that the law of war is international law.
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27–28, 28 n.5 (citing numerous
cases from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
In the Prize Cases, for instance, the Court held that
the “laws of war, as established among nations, have
their foundation in reason, and all tend to mitigate
the cruelties and misery produced by the scourge of
war.” Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667 (1863).
Likewise, in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, the
Court considered the “general laws of war, as
recognized by the law of nations applicable to this
case.” 92 U.S. 286, 286 (1875).
The Department of Defense Law of War Manual
and the Army Field Manual addressing the law of
land warfare similarly define the law of war as a part
of international law. U.S. Dep’t of Defense Law of
War Manual, at 7 (June 2015); U.S. Army Field
Manual FM 27-10, at 4 (July 1956). The Lieber Code,
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signed by President Lincoln in 1863 to regulate the
conduct of Union forces, described the law of war as
“a branch” of “the law of nations.” See Francis Lieber,
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field art. 27 (War Dep’t 1863).
Law-of-war scholars share this view. Winthrop
explained that “law of war” is “a distinct canon of the
Law of Nations” and defined “law of war” as a “branch
of International Law which prescribes the rights and
obligations of belligerents,” as well as persons under
military government or martial law or in the theater
of war. Winthrop 773. More recent commentators
have observed that “the jurisdiction of military
commissions has been set by the bounds of
international law directly incorporated within
American law,” Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda,
Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 Am. J. Int’l
L. 328, 334 (2002), and that the law of war is a branch
of international law, Major Alex G. Peterson, Order

Out of Chaos: Domestic Enforcement of the Law of
Internal Armed Conflict, 171 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 7–8
(2002).

The government has argued that there is a federal
“common law of war” that expands the subject matter
jurisdiction of a U.S. law-of-war military commission
to encompass war crimes other than those that violate
international law; these crimes, it is said, were
historically tried by military commissions in the
United States. Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 810 (dissenting
opinion).
But as a government of delegated,
enumerated powers, the Constitution prohibits
federal common law crimes. United States v. Hudson
& Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33–34 (1812). The
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Declare War Clause and Congress’s other Article I,
§ 8, war powers, in combination with the Necessary
and Proper Clause, authorize Congress to establish
military commissions to try war crimes. Quirin, 317
U.S. at 26–27. They do not, and constitutionally
cannot, authorize new domestic war crimes over
which the commission may constitutionally exercise
jurisdiction. See Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified
Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1019,
1050–52 (2011).
The D.C. Circuit’s main concurrence located
political branch authority to establish law-of-war
tribunals in the aggregate of executive and
congressional war powers. See Bahlul, 840 F.3d at
761–62 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591–92 (plurality opinion);
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 10. The concurrence also quoted
Winthrop and Justice Story as authorities for the
same proposition. But it misread both to support a
proposition the Court has never embraced: that
constitutional authority to establish law-of-war
tribunals, which derives from the political branches’
war powers, Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591, also empowers
the political branches to define war crimes. Neither
Winthrop nor Story adopted this view. See Winthrop
831; 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States § 1192 (1833).

18

D. The D.C. Circuit’s Main Concurrence
Erroneously Defined International Law as
“the Dictates of Foreign Nations and the
International Community.”
1. International law develops through consent.
The D.C. Circuit’s main concurrence characterized
Bahlul’s jurisdictional argument as an effort that would
subject the United States “to the dictates of foreign
nations and the international community, as
embodied in international law,” and would “allow
foreign nations, through the guise of international
law, to set constitutional limits enforceable in U.S.
courts against the U.S. war effort.” Bahlul, 840 F.3d
at 759, 772 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (emphasis in
original).
Neither foreign nations nor the international
community “dictate” international law. The basic norm
of international law since the nineteenth century has
been consent. Blackstone, for example, described the
law of nations as “a system of rules . . . established by
universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the
world.” 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 66 (1769).
Because the law of war is part of international law,
the United States typically communicates its consent
either expressly (in treaties it has ratified) or
implicitly (in acknowledged principles of customary
international law).
The United States actively
participates in shaping the evolution of international
custom, as it has since the founding. See, e.g., Office
of the Legal Adviser, United States Dep’t of State,
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Digest of United States Practice in International Law
2014, at 302–03 (CarrieLyn D. Guymon ed., 2014).
Today, because of the nation’s economic, military, and
geopolitical power, its influence on the development
of customary international law, especially the law of
war, is correspondingly robust.
Because of the consensual basis of international
law, the United States, like all nations, may refuse to
consent to an emerging customary rule that it
disfavors: The persistent objector doctrine provides
that any “state that has persistently objected to a rule
of customary international law during the course of
the rule’s emergence is not bound by the rule.” Ted
Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The

Principle of the Persistent Objector in International
Law, 26 Harv. Int’l L.J. 457, 457 (1985).
2. It is not unremarkable for international law to
play a role in constitutional interpretation.
It is thus hardly “extraordinary” or a “suicide pact,”

Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 759, 772 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring), for the United States to abide by the
principles of international law to which it has consented.
Nor is it extraordinary for those principles to influence
constitutional interpretation. The Constitution refers to
international law in several provisions. Constitutional
powers subsume authority conferred and given
substantive content by international law. For
example, the Constitution’s vesting of Congress’s
powers related to war, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; “the
executive Power,” id. art. II, § 1; and the Commanderin-Chief power, id. art. II, § 2, confer wartime powers
on Congress and the President derived from and
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informed by international law.4 The Constitution
takes precedence over international law in the event
of an unavoidable conflict, see, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 324 (1988); Reid, 354 U.S. at 16–18, but
international law, in appropriate circumstances,
informs several of its provisions.
The Constitution confers certain powers on the
President and Congress in wartime precisely because
international law regards them as well-established
incidents of waging war. Hamdi, for example,
recognized executive power to detain belligerents for
the duration of a conflict “based on longstanding lawof-war principles.”
542 U.S. at 521 (collecting
international authorities); see also Quirin, 317 U.S. at
28-29.
And in Hamdan, the Court’s most recent decision
on military commissions, the Court concluded that
Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of
1949, see, e.g., Geneva Convention (III) Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, is what the D.C. Circuit’s main
concurrence would describe as a “judicially
enforceable constraint” on the authority of the
political branches to define the procedures and
minimal due process safeguards of the military
commission that tried Hamdan.

Both the President and Congress also exercise some atextual
constitutional powers by virtue of international law. See, e.g.,
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
318–19 (1936); Chae Chang Ping v. United States (Chinese
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889).
4
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III.

THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S MAIN
CONCURRENCE PLACED NO LIMITS
ON THE JURISDICTION OF MILITARY
COMMISSIONS

A. The D.C. Circuit’s Main Concurrence
Transgressed the Supreme Court’s Limits on
the Jurisdiction of Military Commissions.
To ensure the judiciary’s integrity and
independence, any displacement of the judicial power
from the judicial branch must be carefully limited and
defined. See Stern, 564 U.S. at 484; The Federalist
No. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Military tribunals therefore must be restricted “to the
narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential.”
Toth, 350 U.S. at 22. “Every extension of military
jurisdiction is an encroachment on the jurisdiction of
civil courts, and . . . acts as a deprivation of the right
to jury trial and of other treasured constitutional
protections.” Reid, 354 U.S. at 21.
Even if erosions of judicial power seem relatively
inconsequential
at
first,
“illegitimate
and
unconstitutional practices get their first footing in
that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight
deviations from legal modes of procedure.” Stern, 564
U.S. at 503 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 635 (1886)). This is especially true if the erosion
is enshrined in a judicial opinion: “The principle then
lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of
any authority that can bring forward a plausible
claim of an urgent need.” Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
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The government argued to the D.C. Circuit that
the jurisdiction of military commissions is limited to
international-law-of-war offenses and offenses that
have historically been tried by U.S. military
commissions.
Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 759–60
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
Yet the main
concurrence did not even accept the government’s
proposed jurisdictional limitations. Instead, it found
that thin historical practice is sufficient for an offense
to be triable by military commission. Id. at 770. But
hesitant to exclude emerging crimes such as
cyberattacks, which would not fall within the rubric
of historical practice, the opinion said it had no need
to define “the outer limits of the Constitution in this
context, other than to say that international law is not
such a limit.” Id. at 771.
The D.C. Circuit’s main concurrence thus
transgressed the jurisdictional limits on military
commissions on which this Court has insisted and
opened the door to a substantial erosion of Article III
judicial power. The refusal even to offer guidance on
the appropriate limits on the subject matter
jurisdiction of military commissions risks further
eroding the independence, power, and structural
integrity of Article III courts. See Reid, 354 U.S. at
23–24.
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B. Widening the Narrow Exception to Article III
for Military Commissions Places Too Much
Judicial Power in the Political Branches.
1. The nature and scope of current hostilities
threaten traditional limitations on military
commission jurisdiction.
The threat that military commissions will
encroach on the general exclusivity of Article III is
compounded today because traditional limits on the
jurisdiction of military commissions, which were
established by the nature and scope of past wars,
arguably apply differently in the context of a global
armed conflict that risks continuing indefinitely. See
Bahlul, 840 F.3d at 835 (dissenting opinion).
Current wars involving non-state belligerents
make it much more difficult to define those persons
subject to the jurisdiction of military commissions or
to determine what conduct occurred on the battlefield.
Id. at 836. The Authorization for Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(AUMF), the basis for Bahlul’s detention and trial by
military commission, is more than fifteen years old,
and the global conflict with transnational terrorism is
the longest war in the nation’s history. See Hamdan,
584 U.S. at 684–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(concluding that we have been at war with al Qaeda
since 1996, when the terrorist network declared war
on the United States).
Because members of al Qaeda and “associated
forces,” as broadly defined under current law and
practice, reside, plot, plan, and fight in dozens of
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nations, the AUMF authorizes a potentially indefinite
war, potentially indefinite presidential war powers,
and a potentially permanent system of military
commissions, often operating in parallel with the
federal courts. That arrangement would be wholly at
odds with the history and functional rationale for
such a commission. As Justice O’Connor wrote in
Hamdi:
[W]e understand Congress’ grant of authority
for the use of “necessary and appropriate force”
to include the authority to detain for the
duration of the relevant conflict, and our
understanding is based on longstanding law-ofwar principles. If the practical circumstances
of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of
the conflicts that informed the development of
the law of war, that understanding may
unravel. But that is not the situation we face
as of this date.
542 U.S. at 521.
It is the situation we face today, well over a decade
after Hamdi. The lack of clear jurisdictional limits on
military commissions allows the political branches to
increase the number of people triable by law-of-war
military commissions. It is also contrary to the
concept of necessity that underwrites the history and
rationale for military commissions. Military

Commissions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed
Servs., 111th Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of David

Kris, Assistant Attorney General, Nat’l Security
Division, Dep’t of Justice) (“In the past, military
commissions have been associated with a particular
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conflict of relatively short duration. In the modern
era, however, the conflict could continue for a much
longer time.”).
2. The erosion of judicial power through the
expansion of military commissions threatens
liberty.
Military commissions do not “rank along with
Article III courts as adjudicators of the guilt or
innocence of people.” Toth, 350 U.S. at 16. Relieving
“those in civil life from military trials” was central to
the Founders’ rebellion against the British Empire
and the Framers’ drafting of the Constitution. See
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 119. “There are dangers
lurking in military trials which were sought to be
avoided by the Bill of Rights and Article III of our
constitution.” Toth, 350 U.S. at 22; see Harold
Hongju
Koh,
The Case Against Military
Commissions, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 337, 341 & n.22
(2002).
Accordingly, permitting military commission
jurisdiction that is unconstrained by this Court’s
previously-imposed limitations provides the political
branches the opportunity to usurp judicial power,
threatening the structural protections and individual
rights that Article III protects. Cf. Stern, 564 U.S. at
483–84 (“The colonists had been subjected to judicial
abuses at the hand of the Crown . . . because the King
of Great Britain ‘made Judges dependent on his Will
alone . . . .’” (quoting The Declaration of Independence
para. 11)). The Court should grant certiorari to
prevent military commissions’ erosion of the federal
judicial power vouchsafed by Article III. And it
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should reiterate what it has held for at least seventy
years: military commissions may only try violations of
the law of war, a branch of international law, in
circumstances of military necessity.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici urge this Court
to grant Bahlul’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
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